Whereas the social and emotional consequences of childhood trauma are well documented, less is known about how young children understand, represent, and remember traumatic experiences. A review of the literature indicates striking similarities in the development of young children's ability to recall traumatic and nontraumatic events. More specifically, events experienced before the age of about 18 months do not seem to be verbally accessible; events experienced between about 18 months and 2.5-3 years are reported in fragmentary fashion and seem to be prone to increasing error over time. From about age 3 years on, children can give reasonably coherent accounts of their past experiences and can retain these memories over long durations. The ways in which children are able to participate in conversations about events as they are occurring and in retrospect seems to play a critical role in their developing event memories. Implications of the empirical data for understanding trauma memory in childhood are discussed.
Statistics from both clinical and community memory. Although this research focuses on children's developing memories of everyday samples indicate that one out of four individuals in our culture experience trauma as a child and/or positively valenced events, it provides a framework for understanding the develop-(Brewin, Andrews, & Gotlieb, 1993; Elliot, 1996) . Given these epidemic proportions, sur-ment of memory in general, within which memory for trauma must be placed. I then prisingly little developmental research has focused on how children understand traumatic turn to the clinical literature describing case studies of severely traumatized children. This experiences. Although there is considerable evidence that severe trauma often leads to research provides the richest information on memory of trauma, but obviously lacks cersocioemotional difficulties (Beitchmen, Zucker, Hood, daCosta, Ackman, & Cassavia, tain experimental controls. In the third section, I turn to the small but growing body of 1992; Briere & Elliot, 1994) , the processes by which some children are able to cope with experimental research on children's memories for stressful experiences. In trying to integrate even quite severe trauma are mostly unknown. In this review, I will argue that a criti-findings across these three areas, several issues emerge as critical in the study of trauma cal piece of this puzzle relies on the ways in which young children are able to make sense memory, and I draw these out in the final section, along with recommendations for future out of their traumatic experiences, and this process, in turn, relies on how children come research. Throughout, developmental differences are highlighted, and, in particular, the to represent, interpret, and remember trauma.
In the first section of this paper, I review ways in which developing language skills interact with the development of event memory the literature on the development of event are discussed. Before beginning, it is necessary to point out that, although I use the term "trauma"
The DSM-IV provides a definition of trauma ity, the ability to report an experience is the clearest evidence of a specific, conscious, acthat focuses on threat of death or injury, or the witnessing of death or severe injury cessible memory of an experience. This raises the difficult but intriguing question of the de-(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) , but this definition is only loosely used in the clin-veloping relations between language and memory. I will argue that language allows for ical literature and is not referred to at all in the experimental literature. Moreover, many a different kind of representation than is available without language and that trauma experiof the "stressful" experiences studied in the experimental literature are quite mild (e.g., an enced during the preverbal period is therefore represented in fundamentally different ways inoculation, a broken bone) compared to the extreme stress children are too often exposed than is trauma experienced as children become more verbally sophisticated (see Fivush, to in their everyday lives (e.g., witnessing the brutal murder of a parent, being repeatedly Pipe, Murachver, & Reese, 1997; Fivush & Haden, 1997; and Nelson, 1993, 1996 , for full raped by one's father). Further, the DSM-IV definition highlights threat to one's physical theoretical arguments). Moreover, I focus here on verbal recall in the absence of misintegrity, rather than emotional integrity. As several theorists have argued, emotional be-leading or suggestive questioning. There is no doubt that children, and especially preschooltrayal may be at the core of traumatic experience (Freyd, 1996; Shay, 1996) . ers, are susceptible to suggestion (see Ceci & Bruck, 1993 , for a review), although the conRelated to this idea is the issue of the causal explanation of the traumatic experi-ditions under which children are more or less likely to succumb to suggestion are still someence. Whereas natural disasters may cause a great deal of stress, they are understood in what controversial (e.g., Goodman & Bottoms, 1993 ; Goodman, Rudy, Bottoms, & very different ways than are events perpetrated by human agents, such as abuse, rape Aman, 1990; Steward, 1993) . However, there is general consensus in the field that free reand torture. Natural disasters will not be as prone to lead the victim to self-blame, nor do call, even in quite young children, is very accurate. Again, because my focus here is on natural disasters lead to shame, guilt, and secrecy to the same extent as traumas perpe-memory for trauma, and not on forensic interviewing, the issue of suggestibility is not adtrated by others. Even within traumas perpetrated by others, the relationship between the dressed directly. victim and the perpetrator plays an important role. Witnessing violence committed by The Development of Event Memory strangers in the community may be different than witnessing domestic violence within Over the last two decades it has become abundantly clear that even quite young children one's own home (see Cicchetti, Toth, & Lynch, 1997 , for a full theoretical discussion have well-organized, accurate memories of their past experiences. In 1981 Nelson and of how different types of traumas may lead to different child outcomes). While it is obvi-Greundel published a seminal study examining preschooler's verbal reports about routine ously beyond the scope of this review to provide a viable definition of either trauma or and familiar events, such as going grocery shopping or to McDonald's. In contrast to stress, this remains a thorny issue in the field and often makes it difficult to compare across then prevailing views about the early memory system, children as young as 3 years of age the clinical and experimental literatures.
Finally, I want to emphasize that, because were easily able to give coherent reports of these kinds of events. Although older children this review focuses on the ways in which children represent and recollect trauma, I am fo-generally report more about familiar events than do younger children, younger children's cusing on verbal recall of experience. Although experiences may leave many markers, reports are just as well organized as are older children's. More specifically, children's reincluding changes in behavior and personal-ports are generalized and temporally struc-creasing retention intervals (Hudson & Fivush, 1991; Poole & White, 1993) , but the tured. From age 3 years on, children report what commonly occurs across specific experi-data indicate remarkable abilities to remember distinctive events across the preschool years. ences of an event (e.g., "You get a happy meal and you eat it and go home" when reHowever, a different pattern emerges when we examine preschooler's ability to recall a porting going to McDonald's rather than specifying what happened during one specific ex-single episode of a repeated event. As do adults (Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith, perience at McDonald's) and children report events in the timeless present tense, indicating 1980), children have great difficulty recalling one time that they went to McDonald's, or a general routine rather than a specific occurrence. Further, children virtually always re-what happened on a specific day at school (Fivush, 1984; Hudson & Nelson, 1983 ; see port the component actions of events in their correct temporal order. The form of children's Hudson, Fivush, & Kuebli, 1992, for a review) . Unless the particular episode deviates verbal reports conform to a "script" model, in which events are organized as spatially tem-in a substantial way from what usually happens, children have great difficulty reporting porally organized frameworks that specify which actions are most and least likely to oc-a specific instance (Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Hudson, 1990a) . Moreover, preschoolers seem cur during any given experience of a recurring event (Schank & Abelson, 1977 ; see Fivush, to have more difficulty separating specific instances of a repeated event than do older chil-1997, and Nelson, 1986 , for reviews of the developmental research).
dren and adults. Three-and 4-year-old children are especially likely to confuse details That even quite young children report familiar events as scripts indicates that they are among repeated experiences (Farrar & Goodman, 1990 ). In fact, after experiencing a parable to abstract commonalities across their experiences. But how well can young children ticular event just a few times, 3-and 4-yearold children are quite likely to report only recall one specific experience? Novel events, events that occur only once and remain rela-those actions that occur across occurrences and to omit any actions that occurred during tively distinctive in a child's experience, seem to be quite well recalled by preschoolers. By only one occurrence of the event (Bauer & Fivush, 1992; Hudson, 1990a; Hudson & Nelage 3 , children are able to give accurate detailed reports of specific events such as visits son, 1983; Kuebli & Fivush, 1994) .
These patterns indicate that young children to museums, amusements parks, airplane rides, etc., that they have experienced only may be better able to report the details of a single distinctive experience than a single epionce (Fivush, Gray, & Fromhoff, 1987; Hamond & Fivush, 1990; sode of a repeated event. An event that remains distinctive in the child's experience 1986; Todd & Perlmutter, 1980; see Fivush, 1993 , for a review). Most impressive, chil-also remains memorable; children are able to recall these kinds of events in surprising detail dren's event memories endure over long periods of time. For example, children who went even after long delays. But when recalling a repeated event children's reports are more to Disney World when they were between the ages of 2.5 and 4.5 years were still able to general, focusing on what usually happens.
Details of specific experiences are omitted or give extremely accurate and detailed accounts of their experiences 18 months later (Ha-confused among episodes. It is in this sense that memory is reconstructive; when children mond & Fivush). And Fivush and Schwarzmueller (1998) found that children inter-(and adults) have multiple experiences that are similar, the memory representation beviewed about novel events at age 3 were still able to recall these events accurately 5 years comes more generalized, and what happened during any specific occurrence is reconlater when they were 8 years old. Obviously there is forgetting over time, and there is also structed from this more general knowledge.
Although these script reports are still accusome indication of increased error with in-rate, in the sense that they describe what usuThere is also evidence that children are able to recall events from this period of time ally happens when this event occurs, they are lacking in detail, and may not be completely even as they grow older. Fivush et al. (1987) demonstrated that children not quite 3 years accurate to any one instance of the event.
Thus, by 3 years of age children are able old were able to report accurately details of experiences that occurred up to 10 months in to report verbally both repeated experiences and distinctive experiences, although these re-the past, and Todd and Perlmutter (1980) report that 3-year-olds could accurately recall ports differ in their specificity. What about children younger than age 3 years? How do events that occurred well before their third birthday. However, there does seem to be a children report events as they are just becoming able to talk about the past, and, most intri-lower limit beyond which children do not seem able to recall verbally. Boyer, Barron, guing, are children able to verbally recall events that occurred before they could talk and Farrar (1994) found that children who experienced a specific play event when they at all?
were 20 months of age were able to reenact the event when they returned to the laboratory The development of verbal recall playroom more than a year later, but there was little evidence of verbal recall of the Children begin to refer to past events linguistically at about 20 months of age (Eisenberg, event. Similarly, Myers, Perris, and Speaker (1994) followed children over several years to 1985; Sachs, 1983) , although their references are quite attenuated. Virtually all past refer-assess their memory for a single experience that occurred at 10 or 14 months of age. Alences at this early age are to just completed or very recent events, and are most often in though there was some evidence of behavioral memory of the event, in that children who had direct response to an adult's comments. Frequently, children at this age simply confirm experienced the original event showed more interest in the objects used than did children or repeat an adult's recollection, or give a one word response to a direct question. Within a who had not experienced the event, there was virtually no evidence of explicit recall of the few months, children's abilities to refer to the past develop dramatically, and between the event, either through reenacting what had occurred or through verbal report. ages of about 2.5 and 3 years children become able to give reasonably coherent verbal acIn the most comprehensive study of this issue, Bauer and Wewerka (1997) examined counts of past experiences (Eisenberg; Fivush et al., 1987) . However, young children are children's memory for a series of specific action sequences learned when they were 20 still dependent on adults to help them structure their recall; they provide information in months of age. Memory was assessed after a 1-year delay both behaviorally, in the form of response to direct questions about what occurred. Over the course of the preschool reenactment of the sequences, and verbally.
Overall, children recalled the sequences in acyears, children become less and less dependent on adults' questions to help them recall tion. But only those children who were linguistically more sophisticated at the time of (see Pillemer & White, 1989 , for a review). Essentially, children become more competent the initial experience were subsequently able to recall the event verbally. The patterns sugnarrators about their past experiences, becoming better able to provide a full account of gest that the ability to recall an event verbally may depend on the ability to verbally describe what occurred without specific prompts to do so. However, although younger children need the event at time of experience. Events which occur before sufficient verbal skills develop more cues and prompts in order to provide information and even with prompts usually may not become available for verbal recall even as children develop the language skills provide less information than older children, what young children do recall is quite accu-necessary for describing that event. Further, 20 to 24 months of age seems to be the averrate, at least in the absence of suggestive or misleading questions.
age age at which children are able to describe events as they are occurring, as well as the describe their experiences, they are able to communicate with others about those experiaverage age at which children begin to refer to very recent past events in language. Of ences, even if they can only provide bits and pieces of memory. Essentially, it is discussing course, given the wide individual differences in language skills, this average age must be experiences with others that leads to more coherently organized memories which remain interpreted with great caution. As Bauer and Wewerka have demonstrated, it is the lan-accessible and verbalizable over time (see Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 1996 ; and Nelson, guage skills that predict subsequent verbal recall and not the age of the child.
1993, 1996, for related arguments). Two lines of evidence support this theoretIt is important to point out that even well before the development of language skills, ical speculation. First, the way in which events are talked about as they are occurring children are able to retain fairly explicit memories of specific events. Bauer and her col-has a profound influence on the way in which children subsequently recall that event. Tesleagues (see Bauer, 1996 Bauer, , 1997 , for reviews) have demonstrated that 12-to 13-month-olds sler and Nelson (1994) found that when recalling a visit to a museum, or a photo-taking can easily learn a sequence of actions performed on a set of novel objects, and, more excursion, 4-year-old children recalled those aspects of the event that were mutually disimpressive, when these children return to the laboratory many months later, they still show cussed by mother and child during the event.
Information commented on only by the evidence of recalling the previously learned event sequences. However, these children do mother, or even only by the child, tended not to be recalled. So it is not simply what is nonot seem to be able to describe these events verbally as they get older. Thus the argument ticed, or even what is labeled during the event that is critical; rather it is what is jointly conis that there is something special about being able to describe an event verbally as it is oc-structed through conversations that the child recalls. Recent research by Haden, Didow, curring that allows for a different kind of representation, one that remains verbally accessi -Ornstein, and Eckerman (1997) demonstrated the same effect with 2.5-year-olds. ble over time.
When jointly discussing aspects of an event, the mother and child are essentially The role of language in event memory creating an extended narrative about what is happening, and this may be what helps orgaWhat is it about being able to verbally describe an event as it is occurring, even in a nize the event for the child. In an innovative study, Pipe, Dean, Canning, and Murachver limited way, that allows for later verbal recall? Memories of experienced events must be (1996) asked 5-year-old children to play "pirate." Half of the children experienced the encoded in multiple modalities, including sensory and visual images, but these memories event with full narration (e.g., "Now we are going to make the magic treasure map. First do not seem to be "translatable" into language if they occurred in the first 1.5-2 years of life. we have to mix these colors . . . ," etc.) and half the children experienced exactly the same At the simplest level, it may be that events must be encoded linguistically in order to be event but with "empty" language (e.g., "Now we're going to do this"). Children's' memorecalled in language. But this only leads to the question of how language changes the mem-ries for the experience were assessed both through reenactment and verbal recall. Not ory representation. Following from Vygotskian theory (1978) , language can be concep-surprisingly, children experiencing full narration during the event subsequently reported tualized as a tool that allows children to organize experiences in a new way. Most im-the experience more accurately, more fully, and in a more organized way than did chilportant, language allows children to share their memories with others in a way that is dren who experienced only empty language.
But intriguingly these same effects held for not possible outside of language. Once children have even rudimentary language skills to reenactment of the event, suggesting that the presence of narration helped children form a in the first place. The argument, then, is not that language per se leads to a different kind more organized representation of the experience.
of memory representation, but rather that language provides a new tool allowing children It is not just how an event is talked about as it is occurring that is important; the way in to engage with others in a new way, and this, in turn, allows children to take advantage of which an event is talked about in retrospect also has an effect. Certainly, young children the structure provided by adults to help them understand and organize their experiences need a great deal of support from adults, in the form of questions and cues, in order to more coherently. Events that occur before children develop this ability may be rememverbally report their past experiences. The more structure an adult can provide for the bered in behavior, but the ability to provide a verbal account of an event seems to depend young child, the more the child is able to report. Moreover, parents who discuss past on at least a rudimentary ability to engage in these kinds of conversations when the event events with their preschool children in more detailed and narratively coherent ways have is first experienced.
In summary, it is clear that preschool chilchildren who come to report their experiences in more detailed and narratively coherent dren have accurate, detailed memories of specific experiences and that they can retain ways (Fivush, 1991; Haden, Haine, & Fivush, 1997; McCabe & Peterson, 1991 ; Reese, Ha-these memories over extended periods of time. However, as events are repeated, the den, & Fivush, 1993), indicating that children are learning how to recall their experiences representations become more general and details are lost or confused among episodes. through participating in adult-guided conversations about past events. Interestingly, in the Two-year-olds also seem to have accurate memories of past experiences, although their Pipe et al. (1996) study described above, some children experienced the event without verbal reports are much sparser than older children's. Most provocative, it seems that narration, but after the experience, they were read a story about playing pirate that essen-events occurring before the age of about 20 months may never become accessible for vertially provided the missing narrative. Children in this condition recalled the event in the bal report. As children develop the language skills for engaging in conversations about same way as children who participated in the narrated event, indicating that children were events as they are occurring and in retrospect, they seem to be developing new ways of repable to use the subsequent narration to help them organize the experience after it oc-resenting events that allow for subsequent verbal recall. The question of central interest curred.
1 As children engage in narratively orga-for this review, of course, is whether memory for traumatic experiences follows this same nized conversations about events, both as they are occurring and in retrospect, they come to developmental trajectory. represent their experiences in more coherent ways. Young children seem to be at least Clinical Studies of Real-World somewhat dependent on adults to help them Trauma Memories organize their experiences in these ways, but it is children's developing language skills that Paradoxically, there are two "common-sense" beliefs about trauma memory. On the one allows them to engage in these conversations hand, it is argued that trauma is so shocking that it is essentially "burned into the brain."
remaining difficult to bring to mind. Terr a single traumatic experience in vivid detail (Pynoos & Nader, 1989; Malmquist, 1986; has integrated these folk theories of trauma, and has argued that there are two Terr, 1983 Terr, , 1988 see Reviere, 1996 , for a review). In a seminal study, Terr (1988) detypes of trauma, Type I and Type II. Type I trauma is a single shocking event. Although it scribed 20 case studies of children between the ages of 1 and 5 years when they experimay be extended in time, such as the Chowchilla kidnapping in which children were ab-enced a traumatic event, ranging from a dog bite to an evisceration. All children showed ducted on their school bus and buried alive overnight, the event is a single occurrence. In evidence of remembering the trauma in their behaviors, such as expressing specific fears, contrast, Type II trauma is repeated, or chronic traumatic experiences, such as multi-but children below the age of about 18 months when the trauma occurred were unable to exple instances of physical or sexual abuse occurring over a period of weeks or years. Terr press any verbal memory. Children between 18 and about 28 to 36 months at time of argues that Type I trauma leads to vivid, accurate memory, whereas Type II trauma leads trauma could subseuqently give fragmented, "spotty" verbal accounts; only those children to patchy or even non-existent memories. The reasoning is that in order to cope with re-older than about 2.5-3 years at time of experience were able to give a complete verbal acpeated trauma, children begin to dissociate, or distance themselves from the experience as it count of the trauma. This pattern suggests that children's verbal ability at the time of experiis occurring. Dissociation during the experience leads to poorer encoding, and thus ence is a critical factor in their subsequent ability to recall the experience verbally. poorer memory. But notice that this argument implies that the memories are not "recoverThis conclusion is complicated somewhat by case studies reported by Hewitt (1994) and able" as information never initially encoded obviously cannot be retrieved.
Gaensbauer (1995) . Hewitt describes one young girl who experienced a single incident Terr brings two types of evidence to bear on this theory, First, the clinical literature is of sexual abuse when she was 2 years 7 months but did not disclose it until she was 4 rife with examples of young children displaying vivid recall of single traumatic experi-years old and was then able to describe it in detail. Because the incident was not known to ences (which will be discussed in more detail below). Second, there has been an over-the parents, the child had never been asked to recall this experience before the spontaneous whelming number of individuals who, as adults, claim to recall histories of repeated disclosure; given the child's age, it is quite likely that she would have been able to report childhood sexual abuse that they had previously repressed or forgotten. The problem it verbally even at time of occurrence. What is remarkable is that she was able to retain with this argument is twofold: first, it is not clear how to interpret "recovered" memories this memory over this period of time even though she had never discussed it with any-(see recent reviews by Conway, 1997, and Pezdek & Banks, 1996) . Second, and more one. The second case study reported by Hewitt is more surprising. This child was sexually germane to this paper, there is no evidence that children themselves are unable to recall abused by her grandfather when she was 2 years 1 month of age. At 2 years 3 months repeated experiences of trauma, as Terr's theory suggests. However, it must also be noted she was referred for therapy and, although she could talk about other past experiences, was that little research has examined children's memories of repeated stressful experiences. unresponsive when questioned about the abuse. When she was 6 years old, she began Rather, the clinical literature has focused on children's memories of single instances of to display overly aggressive behavior and when referred back for therapy now gave a trauma.
Virtually all the case studies presented in-verbal account of her earlier sexual abuse. However, two things need to be considered in dicate that children, at least those age 3 or older at time of experience, are able to recall evaluating this case description. First, this child was obviously quite verbal as she was rately. We use our general knowledge about the world to reconstruct what must have hapable to describe other past experiences when in therapy at 2 years 3 months, so her lack of pened during this one experience, either by tagging this experience as typical or atypical. verbal report of the abuse experience may have been due to reluctance rather than inabil-That is, some experiences conform to the way things "usually" happen and thus are rememity to express it verbally. Second, the parents brought her to therapy because they knew she bered in this way, whereas other experiences are remembered as distinct in particular ways, had been abused, and it is quite possible that they spoke with her about this experience in and it is these distinctive aspects that make the specific event particularly memorable. Eithe intervening years, which obviously makes interpretation of the later verbal report diffi-ther way, the specific event may be recalled quite well as a conglomeration of general and cult.
The most compelling evidence of a prever-specific event knowledge. Indeed, autobiographical memories are usually highly accubal experience being verbally reported later in development is a case study described by rate both in adults (Brewer, 1988; Conway, 1995; Neisser et al., 1996; Wagenaar & Gaensbauer (1995) . This child witnessed her mother being blown to pieces by a letter Groeneweg, 1990 ) and children (see Fivush, 1993 , for a review). bomb when she was 12 months of age. When she was 3 years old she described isolated deAs are more mundane memories, trauma memories are not completely accurate either. tails of what she had seen, albeit in a fragmentary way, to her foster mother. Critically, her For example Pynoos and Nader (1989) examined children's memories of a sniper attack at foster mother did not know any of these details. Thus it seems that some aspects of pre-their school and found that children seriously misjudged where they were when the attack verbal experiences may become accessible for verbal recall, but this translation seems lim-began. Children close to the line of fire placed themselves further away, while children furited to describing unconnected bits and pieces of sensory images. While this case study pro-ther away tended to place themselves closer.
Pynoos and Nader interpret this as the chilvides provocative data, the bulk of the evidence from the clinical literature suggests that dren's need to place themselves spatially in a place that matched their emotional experiexperiences occurring before the age of about 18 months do not become accessible for ver-ence-those too close needed to distance themselves whereas those far away needed to bal recall. Experiences between about 18 months and 2.5-3 years can be verbally re-express how close to danger they felt. Similarly, Terr (1983) reports that children kidcalled but this recall is fragmentary. Children older than 2.5-3 years at time of experience napped from their school bus and buried alive overnight were able to recall much of the event remain able to report their traumatic experience in a reasonably coherent narrative in vivid detail 4 years later, but there was evidence of error as well. Some children were over extended periods of time. Intriguingly, this is the same developmental pattern that confused about the chronology of certain events of the day, and one child misremememerges from children's memories of everyday events discussed earlier.
bered one of the kidnappers as being black, when in reality both kidnappers were white. It is important to stress that I am not arguing that trauma memories (or any memories In reviewing the clinical literature, Pynoos, Steinberg, and Aronson (1997) further argue for that matter) are totally accurate. All memory is at least partly reconstructive and all that children may sometimes include fantasies about resolution in their reports of trauma, memories seem to contain at least some error. However, just because a memory report is which may be a useful coping strategy but obviously compromises the memory report. partly reconstructed from general knowledge does not mean that it is in error; general event
The fact that trauma memories do contain some error indicates that traumatic experischemas are so powerful exactly because they allow us to remember and to predict so accu-ences are not "burned into the brain," but that they follow some of the same processes that child was waiting. Half of the children were led to believe the stranger was a burglar, have been documented for more everyday kinds of memories. The question is whether while half were led to believe the stranger had permission to take the box. All children were memories for traumatic and/or stressful events are more or less accurate than non-stressful then asked to identify the stranger from a lineup. Children believing the stranger had perexperiences. From the clinical literature, it is difficult to answer this question, both because mission performed better than children believing the stranger was a burglar, suggesting that children's memories of traumatic experiences are not directly compared to their memories stress interferes with children's memory.
However, it must be emphasized that these for nontraumatic experiences and because the actual event being recalled is often unknown studies focused exclusively on face recognition of strangers, and did not assess any other to the interviewer. More experimentally controlled studies allow a more systematic an-aspects of children's memories, such as the actions and objects comprising the event. In swer to this question.
general, children, especially young children, are not very good at recognizing faces of Experimental Studies of Memory for strangers (see Davies, 1993 , for an overview).
Stressful Events
Moreover, it is not clear that witnessing a burglary under these conditions is comparable to Within the adult literature, there has been substantial investigation of the role of arousal on the kinds of real world traumatic events to which children are exposed. memory (see Christianson, 1992 
, for a review). Following from the Yerkes-Dodson
More recently, several investigators have taken advantage of naturally occurring stresslaw, it was hypothesized that moderate levels of arousal would lead to increased attention ful experiences to examine children's memories of traumatic events. Most often, this reand therefore better memory than low levels of arousal. However, as arousal increased to search examines painful and stressful medical procedures. Goodman and her colleagues high levels, it would disrupt the system, leading to poorer attention and encoding and thus (Goodman, Hirschman, Hepps, & Rudy, 1991; Goodman et al., 1990 ) pioneered this type of poorer memory. Hence, an inverted U-shaped function was predicted. Although some re-research, examining young children's memories for inoculations, and for voiding cyssearch supported such a memory function, the majority of research suggests that increased tourethrograms (VCUGs), an extremely stressful medical procedure involving catheriarousal leads to increased memorability. But this conclusion must be taken with great cau-tization, filling the bladder with fluid and voiding while still on the examination table. tion. Research with adults has focused on participants' memories for video displays of Overall, the results of these studies indicate highly accurate recall of these procedures. emotionally disturbing events, such as car crashes or scenes from horror movies, viewed However, there are developmental and individual differences. Preschoolers, while largely in a laboratory setting. Although these presentations may lead to increased levels of accurate, are less accurate than school-aged children. Further, some children are more acarousal, they are certainly not commensurate with the level of arousal that would be experi-curate than their same-age peers. Intriguingly, those children whose parents report talking enced in a truly traumatic event. Thus it is possible that at extreme levels of arousal, with them about the VCUG procedure after its occurrence were more accurate than children memory would decline.
Research with children has taken a more whose parents avoided discussion of the procedure. ecologically valid form. Early investigations manipulated children's arousal in experimenResearch by Ornstein and his colleagues (Ornstein, 1995; Ornstein, Gordon, & Laurus, tal situations. For example, Peters (1991) had children witness a stranger remove a money 1992) support these findings. They compared children's reports of a well-doctor visit with box from a laboratory playroom in which the their reports of a VCUG experience, and encing high stress seemed to show less recall than children experiencing moderate stress, found that children were able to provide a more exhaustive and more accurate report of they still recalled substantially more than children seem to report about non-stressful expethe VCUG than of a well-doctor visit. Moreover, children maintained a high level of re-riences.
What of children younger than 3 years? call for the VCUG experience over several months, whereas memory for the well-doctor We have already seen from the research on general event memory, as well as from the visit showed a sharper decline in amount of recall and a higher increase in error over time. clinical descriptions of trauma memories, children 3 years and older are able to organize Again, there were developmental and individual differences, with older children generally and retain personal experiences, but younger children may have more difficulty rememberproviding more detail; although preschoolers provided less information overall than older ing and verbally reporting events. Few studies have systematically investigated stressful exchildren, what they did recall was just as accurate. In addition, children who experienced periences in children under the age of 3 years.
In the first study of its kind, Howe, Courage, the VCUG with a technician who explained the procedure to them as it was occurring re-and Peterson (1994) assessed children's memories for emergency room experiences for incalled more information than did children who experienced the event with a technician juries such as lacerations requiring sutures and severe burns. Children ranging in age who did not explain the procedure (Principe, 1996) . Thus it seems that children's memories from 18 months to 5 years were interviewed at home within a few days of their experience of a stressful medical procedure is quite good, and especially so if adults talk with them and again 6 months later. There was a general increase in ability to report information with about what occurred.
The developmental differences are not sur-age, and the youngest children in particular had great difficulty verbalizing their experiprising, in that preschoolers generally recall less than do school age children (Nelson, ences. More specifically, children younger than 30 months at time of experience recalled 1986; Pressley & Schneider, 1986) . However, it does seem that preschoolers recall more little at either interview. Children 30 months and older were able to report their experiences about stressful events than about non-stressful events. In addition to the Ornstein finding at time of occurrence and could still recall them in as much detail after 6 months. Similar cited above, Bahrick, Parker, Merritt and Fivush (in press) assessed preschooler's memo-findings are reported by Baker-Ward and Burgwyn-Bailer (1998) , who found that 3-to ries for Hurricane Andrew, a devastating storm during which children were in their 7-year-old children experiencing facial lacerations were able to recall their experiences achomes while wind and rain caused extensive damage all around them. Three and 4-year-curately and in as much detail after a 1 year delay. old children provided a surprising amount of information about their experience, averaging Following up on this methodology, Peterson and Bell (1996) asked 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-over 100 propositions. Because a comparable interview protocol and coding scheme was year-old children to recall injuries and emergency room treatments both immediately and used, this can be compared to children's memories of a family trip to Disney World 6 months later. From age 3 years on, children were able to report their experiences accu- (Hamond & Fivush, 1990) , in which preschoolers reported approximately 40 proposi-rately and in detail, although older children recalled more than did younger children. Most tions. Interestingly, children who weathered the storm under moderate stress (trees falling, impressive, there was little decline in memory over the 6 month delay. But 2-year-olds windows breaking, water leaking into the house) recalled more information than chil-showed a different pattern. Although they were able to recall bits and pieces immedidren experiencing high stress (roofs caving in, flying glass, etc.). Although children experi-ately, their reports included more error than did the older children's (whose reports were that memories of trauma are at least as detailed if not more so than memories of more virtually error-free). Moreover, over time, these very young children showed increasing mundane experiences. However, several factors need to be integrated with this overall error in their verbal reports, suggesting that these early fragmentary memories may be espe-conclusion.
First, although not discussed in this paper, cially prone to reconstructive error over time.
More recently, Peterson and Rideout a significant literature on suggestibility indicates that preschoolers are more suggestible (1997) have reported on the developmental course of trauma memories in even younger than older children (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Ceci, Toglia, & Ross, 1987) . Thus, although children. Children experiencing injuries and emergency room treatments when they were in the absence of misleading and coercive questions, preschoolers are able to maintain between 12 and 33 months were studied. Children younger than 18 months at time of injury accurate memories of past experiences over long periods of time, when exposed to suggeswere unable to report their experiences immediately, and were still unable to report their tive and especially coercive questioning, preschoolers begin to display substantially more experiences verbally 18 months after the event. Children between 20 and 25 months error in their reports than do older children.
The conditions under which suggestive quesalso could not give a verbal report at time of experience but some of these chidlren were tioning may be particularly harmful are still under debate. Children seem to be less sugable to recall their experiences 2 years later, although there was a great deal of error. Chil-gestible about actions performed by themselves or on their own bodies than about acdren older than 27 months displayed impressive recall immediately and 2 years later. This tions performed by other people (Goodman et al., 1990; Rudy & Goodman, 1991 ; Steward, pattern is similar to Terr's description of the development of trauma memories based on 1993). Children also seem to be less suggestible under interviewing conditions in which clinical case studies. Moreover, although language ability was not directly assessed, Pe-they are explicitly told that the interviewer may not know what happened, and that they terson and Rideout note that it appears that it is the child's ability to verbalize the event at can answer "I don't know" when appropriate (see Goodman & Bottoms, 1993 , for an overthe time of occurrence that is the critical factor in long term verbal memory, not the age view). On the other hand, children seem to be more susceptible to suggestion when misinper se, a finding concordant with Bauer and Werwerka's (1997) conclusions discussed formation is presented repeatedly across several interviews (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995) . earlier.
However, simply asking a child to recall an Recollecting Trauma: Summary event over and over, in the absence of misand Implications leading information does not compromise accuracy of recall (Fivush & Schwarzmueller, Impressively, the experimental and clinical literatures converge on a similar develop-1995; Poole & White, 1995) , although yes/no questions lead to extremely high levels of inmental description of verbal memory. Whether reporting everyday events, such as accuracy, especially among very young children (Peterson & Rideout, 1997 ; Schwarzgoing to McDonald's, distinctive personal experiences, such as a trip to Disney World, a mueller, 1997). Clearly, when evaluating children's memories, especially in a forensic stressful experience, such as getting sutures, or a severely traumatic event, such as sexual situation, the extent and type of interviewing that has occurred must be considered in deterabuse, by the age of 3 years children are able to give detailed accurate accounts of what oc-mining the credibility of the report.
Second, although 3-year-olds are quite accurred. Although few studies have directly compared memories for traumatic experiences curate in what they report, their recall is considerably sparser than older children's. Morewith memories for nontraumatic experiences, what little evidence exists seems to suggest over they need more help from adults, in the form of prompts and cues in order to recall is also some indication that African American males incorporate more fantasy elements in than do older children. Here, we need to make a distinction between accuracy of recall and their autobiographical narratives than do African American girls or Caucasian children of exhaustiveness of recall. Older children recall much more of the event, and especially more either gender (Sperry, 1991) . Most of these differences can be attributed to differences in details about the event than do younger children; thus older children's recall is more ex-the ways in which children are socialized to discuss their past experiences (Fivush, in haustive than is younger children's. But although more limited in amount, what young press; Mullen, 1994; Nelson, 1993) , a point returned to below. Implications of these difchildren do recall is just as accurate as older children's recall. The fact that young children ferences for forensic interviewing are clear; the social and cultural guidelines for when need more encouragement from adults to produce their recall also raises the question of and how to talk about one's personal past critically influences the ways in which children how to best interview young children in forensic situations. Clearly, we need to strike a will report their past experiences, and must be considered both in interviewing young chilbalance between providing prompts while at the same time not providing any misinforma-dren and in evaluating the credibility of their reports. tion. Some promising approaches to forensic interviewing of young children have been disFinally, we need to consider the issue of recalling a single versus a repeated expericussed in the literature (Goodman & Bottoms, 1993) , but this is obviously an area in which ence. Within the literature on event memory, it is very clear that memories of repeated exa great deal more research is needed.
Third, there are substantial individual dif-periences are quite different than memories of single, distinctive events. With increasing exferences in children's abilities to report their past experiences.
2 Certainly some of the dif-perience with an event, children's reports become more general and less detailed. Extrapoferences early in development are related to language ability. Because children progress lating to trauma memories, it would seem that repeated trauma would come to be reprethrough the language learning years at different rates, it follows that their ability to de-sented in a script-like format, focusing on commonalties across experiences with a conscribe their past experiences will differ as well (e.g., Eisenberg, 1985) . There are also comitant loss of detail. Provocatively, this prediction is the same as Terr's (1991) predicindividual differences in basic memory skills that play a role (e.g., Pressley & Schneider, tion about Type II trauma discussed earlier, although the postulated mechanisms are quite 1986). In addition to specific individual differences, there are also gender and cultural different. For Terr, poor memory of repeated trauma is due to dissociation, whereas from differences in autobiographical reports. In general, girls seem to have more detailed and script theory, poor memory for repeated trauma would be due to the development of a more coherent autobiographical memories than do boys (Fivush, 1998; Haden et al., more generalized schema for the event.
Only one study has examined children's 1997; Reese, Haden, & Fivush, 1996) . And Caucasian children seem to have more elabo-reports of a repeated traumatic experience.
Howard, Osborne, and Baker-Ward (1997) rated, detailed autobiographical narratives than Asian children (Leichtman, 1997) . There asked children who had undergone chemotherapy to recall their experiences two years after treatment ended. Children were ex-2. Just as there are individual differences in the accuracy tremely accurate in reporting their chemotherand detail of children's autobiographical accounts, apy experiences. However, Howard et al. did there are also individual differences in susceptibility to not differentiate whether children were recallsuggestion. Relations between accuracy and exhausing a specific instance or whether they were tiveness of the recall and susceptibility to suggestion are still being determined. recalling what usually occurred. As discussed earlier, script reports are quite accurate to that are not possible outside of language.
Children can now refer to past events in conwhat typically happens, but the details of specific instances can be lost or confused. Still, versation with parents and caregivers, and this process of reminiscing fundamentally changes this study suggests that Terr's theory may not be completely correct, as children did not dis-the way in which memories can be understood and represented. More specifically, through play poor memory of a repeated trauma. Clearly, this is a critical issue for future re-discussing events with others, both as they are occurring and in retrospect, children become search. Because many traumatized children experience repeated instances of trauma, par-able to organize events in more coherent ways. Through the narrative conventions of ticularly if the trauma is physical or sexual abuse, we must gather more data on the ways describing the past, children come to organize past experiences in more temporally extended in which children come to represent and report these events with increasing experience. and integrated ways. Moreover, narrative forms provide perspective and interpretation Perhaps most important are the qualitative changes we see in memory under the age of 3 of events (Bruner, 1987; Fivush & Haden, 1997; Labov, 1982) . Through narrating our years. Although 2-year-olds are able to verbally report bits and pieces of their past expe-experiences, we come to understand what these experiences mean in relation to other riences, they have difficulty giving a coherent account of what occurred. More specifically, events in our lives, and begin to form a narratively organized life history. This narrative events experienced below the age of about 18 months may never become accessible for ver-history, in turn, contributes to the developing sense of self in time. As children develop the bal report, although they may continue to influence behavior. Children may be able to re-skills for narrating their past, they are also developing an understanding that their past is a tain fairly explicit nonverbal memories of a specific experience; placed back in the origi-part of themselves.
From this perspective, the ability to discuss nal context or given the specific objects, even very young children may be able to re-enact past experiences with others is a critical component of the developing ability to recall an event. But these early memories are not translated into language as the child's lan-events to oneself. Indeed, there is growing evidence that children's autobiographical and guage skills mature. Moreover, without language, it may not be possible to access or re-narrative skills develop in social interaction (Engel, 1986; Haden, et al., 1997; Hudson, port experiences in the absence of physical cues about the event. That is, it is not clear 1990b; Fivush, 1991; McCabe & Peterson, 1991; Nelson, 1993; Peterson, 1990 ; Reese, et how a memory could be expressed nonverbally with none of the objects from the origi-al., 1993). In general, children who engage in rich, embellished reminiscing with their carenal event available in the environment.
However, this does not necessarily mean givers come to discuss their past experiences in more coherent and detailed ways. that later memories, memories of events experienced after 18 months, are represented linWith respect to trauma memories, children experiencing stressful medical procedures unguistically. Rather, events are experienced in multiple modalities and may remain accessi-der conditions in which their parents or medical caregivers discuss the events with them ble in multiple modalities over time. Events that cannot be verbally accessed may still be recall the event more accurately than children who do not discuss these events with others. recalled in action, in images and in sensory characteristics. Language adds yet another di-Intriguingly, these children also seem to display less stress about the experience, suggestmension to the memory representation. But it is a critical dimension in that once children ing that talking about traumatic experiences may help children to understand and cope are able to use language as a modality for representing events, they also become capable of with them. Yet one of the critical aspects of experiencing trauma is the issue of silence. sharing their experiences with others in ways The Silencing of Trauma speculative, although as noted there are a few indications in the research findings that provide preliminary support for this position. Traumatized individuals often report that they are discouraged by others to discuss their If this argument holds, then it has particular implications for memories of abuse, one of experiences. For example, Shay (1996) describes the experience of Vietnam veterans, the most wide spread traumas experienced by children. Abusive parents do not provide a cowho returned with horrendous memories they felt a need to share with others and being si-herent verbal framework for understanding what is happening. If anything, abusive parlenced by family and friends who could not bear to hear what they had to say. Part of this ents tend to provide a misleading framework for the child (e.g., in physical abuse, labeling may stem from a folk belief that if we simply do not talk about or think about bad experi-it punishment for misbehavior, or in sexual abuse, calling it a special game). Without the ences, they will go away. Parents, in particular, may think that if they don't talk about opportunity to discuss these experiences with others, abused children may be unable to intetraumatic experiences with their young children, then their children will simply forget grate their traumatic experiences into their developing understanding of other experiences what happened. What are the implications of the silencing of trauma for children's ultimate in the world and how these experiences are related to the self. This would most likely prounderstanding of these kinds of experiences?
The research reviewed in this paper indi-duce a fragmentary and disorganized representation of experience. Notice that this decates that young children are at least partly dependent on an adult's guidance to organize scription of event representation is related to aspects of clinical descriptions of dissociation their experiences. Children experiencing events in the absence of adult provided narration in abused children. Thus in the absence of an organized framework for understanding expehave a less organized and less accurate representation of what occurred. Because these rience, children will display what appears to be dissociative behaviors-an inability to ormemories are more fragmented, it seems quite likely that it will be more difficult for children ganize experiences, difficulty integrating experience with self-concept, and a general lack to make sense of them and to integrate them with other events in their lives. Notably, of verbal memories of personally experienced events. Clearly, I am not arguing that the conwithin the clinical literature, there is widespread agreement that treatment for trauma-sequences of abuse stem solely from the disruption of memory processing, but I would artized individuals involves constructing a coherent account of what occurred (Foa, gue that this is an important part of what is happening developmentally for these children. Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; Harber & Pennebaker, 1992) . Further, there is now a substantial body of empirical support for the idea that Conclusions creating a coherent account of stressful and traumatic experiences has long term effects on The ability to organize and understand our experiences is a basic part of how we make both emotional and physical well-being (see Pennebaker, 1997, for a review). Past event sense of our world. From a very early age, children are actively constructing how things narratives provide a way of understanding and interpreting events. For traumatic experiences, happen, and forming memories of the events of their lives. From approximately age 3 years the narrative form may allow children to place these experiences in an appropriate context, to on, children's event memories seem qualitatively similar across development. Children help them cope with these experiences, and ultimately to provide some closure on the are able to form and retain accurate, organized, verbally accessible memories of both event. In the absence of discussing these experiences with others, children may have par-traumatic and nontraumatic events. Between the ages of about 2 and 3 years, children are ticular difficulty understanding and coping with trauma. This argument is obviously quite able to give fragmentary verbal reports of their experiences, but these reports do not priate framework for understanding traumatic experiences and thus remain unable to underseem as well organized or as accurate as older children's. Moreover, these very early memo-stand what has happened to them. Thus, although preschool children seem to recall trauries may be more prone to increasing error over time than later memories. Below the age matic and non-traumatic events quite well, a critical issue which is only beginning to be of about 18-20 months, children seem unable to verbally report their experiences at all, and addressed in the research literature is the role of language and silence in children's developthey do not seem to be able to construct a verbal report of these very early experiences ing memories of events in general, and trauma in particular. As Binjamin Wilkomirski (1996) as their language skills develop. Importantly, the developmental patterns seem quite similar writes in his memoirs of his experiences as a child survivor of the Nazi concentration for traumatic and nontraumatic experiences.
The research on traumatic memories con-camps, ducted thus far, however, has focused on public events, events which may be painful or I grew up and became an adult in a time and in a stressful, but do not involve secrecy or shame. society that didn't want to listen, or perhaps was But many traumas experienced by young chil-incapable of listening. "Children have no memodren are silenced. The ability to discuss past ries, children forget quickly, you must forget it all, events with others, and to verbally rehearse it was just a bad dream." These were the words, endlessly repeated, that were used on me from my these events to oneself may play an instruschool days to erase my past and make me keep mental role on children's developing abilities quiet . . . I wrote these fragments of memory to exto understand and interpret their experiences. going life history allows one to integrate past (pp. 153-155) experiences into a cohesive sense of how the world works and who one is. Children experiencing traumatic experiences who are not As feminist theorists have pointed out, giving voice to events lends them power and credgiven the opportunity to discuss these events with others may not be able to integrate these ibility (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986; Gilligan, 1982) . In contrast, sinegative experiences, and thus may be left with recurring fragments of memory that are lencing events deprives them of reality and meaningfulness. We must understand chilassociated with highly negative affect that cannot be resolved. Moreover, in the absence dren's developing memories of trauma both from what they tell us and from what they of adult guidance, young children may not be able to provide themselves with an appro-cannot say.
